The aim of this paper is to explore a parallelism between two episodes in the history of economic thought in order to suggest that the interaction between them can contribute to the research on Kaleckian growth and distribution models. First, a brief summary of the theoretical development from Steindl's stagnationist claims to the debate about demand regimes is offered. Then, a more detailed account is provided of the Latin American debate that began with Furtado's stagnationist claims and resulted in the formulation of models of social articulation and disarticulation. Finally, an analytical classification of Kaleckian and Latin American growth and distribution models is provided, indicating the way in which sectoral heterogeneity and demand composition can act as a plausible link between growth and distribution.
social articulation or disarticulation, that is, of cumulative processes involving growth and inequality (Taylor and Bacha, 1976, De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1983) 1 .
By exploring this parallelism, this paper aims to provide a classification of Kaleckian and Latin American growth and distribution models that goes beyond the one based on a conventional understanding of the demand and distributive schedules (Taylor, 2010: 188) .
Examining the way in which sectoral heterogeneity can be incorporated in this framework and the cumulative processes that it may generate, this analysis points towards an additional mechanism connecting growth and distribution that may be important to interpret particular historical developments, but that is largely overlooked by the Kaleckian literature, despite notable exceptions (Taylor, 1989; Dutt, 1990: chaps. 6-7) . Even if abstracting from these issues might be adequate in certain cases, a reinterpretation of the demand and distributive schedules that incorporates sectoral heterogeneity (both in the production and in the consumption dimensions) seems to give a powerful contribution to the attempts to understand the dynamic interaction between growth and distribution.
From stagnationist claims to demand regimes: the Kaleckian thread
With hindsight, it seems incredible that in the aftermath of World War II there was widespread concern with a potential economic stagnation of the rich countries (or "mature economies," as they were then called). After all, the following two decades would be characterized by an extraordinary prosperity and would be called the "golden age" of capitalism (Armstrong et al., 1984 (Armstrong et al., /1991 . But the economic troubles that plagued Europe after World War I were still too recent to be ignored and averting their repetition was a widely shared objective. Steindl's (1952 Steindl's ( /1976 ) Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism is a product of this context. Its characterization of postwar capitalism did not sink into oblivion, in spite of the ensuing "golden age," surviving in a branch of Marxism initiated by Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy's Monopoly Capital (1966) . Steindl's argument is the postwar version of a much older underconsumptionist tradition. According to him, in a competitive economy, if the growth rate and capacity utilization decreased, competitive pressure would ensure that the less efficient producers would be eliminated by the more efficient ones in a price war that tended to diminish the average profit margins (Steindl, 1979: 5-8) . These reduced margins would, in their turn, stimulate the resumption of growth and the recovery of the capacity utilization ratio. However, in an oligopolistic economy this stabilization mechanism would no longer work, because profit margins become rigid, and a deceleration of growth would not face any countervailing force. As a result, stagnation could become permanent. But why does increasing concentration make the profit margins rigid? In Steindl's (1979: 7) words, in an oligopolistic economy "aggressive price strategies become very risky, because the few main producers all have substantial margins, and to drive out one of them would require a ruinous price war. If the growth rate declines, the oligopolists are therefore more prepared in most cases to accept low long-term rates of utilization than to engage in cut-throat competition." 2 Commenting Steindl's and Baran and Sweezy's arguments, Robert Brenner (1998/2006: 54) claims that " [t] he notions of 'monopoly capital' and 'capitalist stagnation' soon revealed themselves (…) to be reification of quite temporary and specific aspects of the economy of the US in the 1950s." Steindl (1979: 8-13 ) himself had defended his argument against this kind of criticism, claiming that the growth rates observed in the 1950s and 1960s
did not contradict his interpretation, since they could be explained by resorting to other factors. And, since the 1970s, the tendency towards stagnation could once more be clearly identified, according to him.
Relatively apart from this controversy, in the early 1980s the Kaleckian framework that was the basis for Steindl's argument would be combined with an adaptation of Steindl's own ideas about capacity utilization and the investment function to formulate the early versions of what is now called Kaleckian growth and distribution models (Rowthorn, 1981 , Dutt, 1984 , Taylor, 1985 3 . The objective was no longer to provide an epochal diagnosis of capitalism, but rather to give a mathematical representation of the relationship between growth and the functional distribution of income, that might be useful to throw light on concrete economic developments (Amitava Dutt's paper addresses an episode of economic deceleration in India, for instance). Moreover, while Kalecki and Steindl put a lot of emphasis on the theoretical understanding of cyclical dynamics, the 1980s literature was based on more simple steady state analyses.
Lance Taylor (1985) called his model "stagnationist," but the label was only a sign of its Steindlian heritage. The model did result in a positive relation between the wage share and aggregate demand, but he did not argue that there was a secular tendency to a reduction of the wage share and, as a result, to stagnation, in contrast to Steindl. This positive relation had an affinity with social democrat and Keynesian inclinations to argue for the compatibility between growth and income redistribution 4 . But, in the mid-1980s, with the neoliberal backlash under way, these ideas were losing favor.
A few years later, Amit Bhaduri and Stephen Marglin (1990) used a more general model to show that the mentioned positive relation was just one possibility among others (something that had also been suggested by Robert Blecker, 1989) . The novelty of Bhaduri and Marglin's work was not to show that there could be an inverse relationship between the wage share and growth, since this was a common view, shared by most classical economists and by the Cambridge Keynesians. Their contribution was simply to demonstrate that it could also be derived from the Kalecki-Steindl framework, if investment was assumed to respond to the profit share instead of the profit rate 5 . Similarly, Blecker (1989) showed that the inverse relationship could also come about if the effect of international competition on the mark-up was taken into consideration. Bhaduri and Marglin (1990:184) were explicit about the politics behind their argument:
"The social democrats and their academic allies, the Left Keynesians, put forward the political and intellectual case for the view that high capacity utilization would resolve the contradiction between high wages and high profits. Emphasizing the demand side, neglecting the cost side, they believed that high wages would contribute not only to high levels of output and employment but also to high levels of profits and accumulation. (…) the co-operative interpretation of Keynes became increasingly inconsistent with facts."
Their formulation, thus, included two cases: one with the positive relation between the wage share and aggregate demand and the other with a negative relation 6 . They called the former the "stagnationist" case, following Taylor, and named the latter the "exhilarationist" one. At this point, these terms were not at all illuminating. In a survey from 2002, Robert 4 According to some of these models, not only growth and redistribution were compatible, but also both classes could benefit from redistribution, given that an increase in the wage share, through its effect on capacity utilization, could raise the profit rate. This case was called the cooperative wage-led demand regime. The models also allowed for the conflictive case, however. See Bhaduri and Marglin (1990: 388-390) and Blecker (2002: table 8 .1) for this taxonomy. 5 Formally, Bhaduri and Marglin's (1990: 380) investment function can be represented as ! = + + , in which and denote, respectively, the profit share and the utilization ratio, while , and are parameters. Dutt's (1984: 28) investment function, in its turn, can be represented as ! = + + = + + , in which stands for the profit rate, which is equal to the profit share multiplied by the output-capital ratio and, if the latter is used as a proxy for the utilization ratio, can be represented as . 6 In fact, the taxonomy can be extended to distinguish between conflictive and cooperative cases of both wageled and profit-led demand regimes. Another distinction that has been made is the one between wage-led and profit-led accumulation. See Bhaduri and Marglin (1990: 388-390) and Blecker (2002: Blecker (2002: 148, fn. 17) felt he had to clarify that "a stagnationist economy need not actually be stagnant. Stagnationism is simply the case of wage-led aggregate demand, in which an increased profit share depresses aggregate demand, but an increased wage share boosts it." The phrases slowly fell out of favor and currently the most common designation for the two cases is simply wage-led and profit-led demand.
With Bhaduri, Marglin and Blecker, then, the theoretical impulse that began with Steindl was able to leave behind the stagnationist stance and transform itself into a more comprehensive framework to examine the interactions between demand and distribution in a capitalist economy 7 . This development might be understood, following Marglin and Bhaduri (1990: 155) , by resorting to the "distinction between a theory of a capitalist economy in which aggregate demand plays a central role, and models built on particular assumptions about the components of aggregate demand." And they apply this distinction to the literature in question: "we view the Keynesian insistence on aggregate demand as an important ingredient to understanding how modern capitalism works quite generally, but the stagnationist model as very much bound to particular places and times." . Following Michalis Nikiforos and Duncan Foley (2012: 202-204) , the demand schedule is derived from the equivalence between aggregate investment and aggregate savings, considering both of them as functions of income distribution and of the level of capacity utilization, :
7 Paulo dos Santos (2015: 663) has recently provided a negative assessment of the theoretical development from Steindl to the Kaleckian models, considering the work of the former as one among many "integrated theorizations of the secular development of capitalism, and the endogenous contradictions it may face", whereas the latter are called "more partial discussions." The contrasting positive assessment offered above assumes that the Kaleckian models should not be considered in isolation, but could lead to more sophisticated theorizations of the development of capitalism if they are combined with a historical diagnosis of the latter. The collective book edited by Marglin and Schor (1990) , combining history and theory, can be read along these lines. As Marglin (1990: 3) puts it in his introduction: "the historical chapters set the stage for and frame the theoretical chapters, and the theory illuminates and focuses history." 8 A referee suggested that an alternative way to interpret this development would be distinguishing between Steindl's story of stagnation and the Kaleckian theory of growth and distribution, with its many different models. In my view, these two sets of distinctions can complement each other. 9 The option of resorting to Nikiforos and Foley's (2012) version of the framework is justified by its simplicity and generality, despite the fact that, by putting the demand and the distributive schedules together, it distances itself from the original contributions to this literature, which tended to assume that demand adjusts more rapidly than distribution.
where is the wage share of income. By assumption, ! is negative (the subscript refers to the partial derivative), assuming that investment is a positive function of the profit share, and ! is positive, representing an accelerator effect. ! , in its turn, is assumed to be negative, given the assumption that capitalists have a higher propensity to save than workers, and ! is positive (higher utilization results in higher incomes, which increases aggregate savings given constant saving propensities). From this equilibrium, it is straightforward to define the impact of a change in distribution on the level of utilization:
The denominator of (2) is usually considered to be negative, supposing that saving responds more strongly than investment to changes in utilization. This assumption is named the Keynesian stability condition. The demand regime, then, depends on the sign of the numerator. If an increase in the wage share reduces savings more than it reduces investment, the numerator will be positive and the demand will be wage-led (that is,
> 0). In the opposite case, with a negative numerator, aggregate demand will be profit-led. This is a very simple framework and numerous extensions have been suggested, which incorporate taxation,
household credit, open economy considerations, technical change, personal income inequality, among other things (see the summaries provided by Blecker, 2002, and Lavoie, 2014: chaps. 5-7) .
From the beginning, the demand schedule was examined in conjunction with what is now called the distributive schedule, that is, the impact of utilization on distribution,
!"
!" (Nikiforos and Foley, 2012: 204-207, Taylor, 2004: chap. 7 ). Dutt's (1984) original contribution, for instance, interpreted the distributive schedule as a result of the impact of growth on the industrial structure and, through this channel, on the mark-up. In this case, there was explicit consideration about the time horizon of each adjustment, the commodity market represented by the demand schedule reaching equilibrium quickly and the industrial structure (represented by the distributive schedule) changing slowly. Alternatively, the distributive schedule could be interpreted as determined by the labor market, in line with Goodwin's (1967) formalization of Marx's argument, for instance (different interpretations of the distributive schedule are discussed in Nikiforos and Foley, 2012: 204-207 Before moving to the Latin American episode, it is important to mention a relatively unknown extension of the Kaleckian framework that is particularly relevant to the present argument. It consists in an attempt by Taylor (1983: 170-176; to examine the Kaleckian results in a two-sector model, separating the production of wage-goods, on the one hand, and of luxury-and capital-goods, on the other
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. He assumes a common wage for both sectors, zero saving by the workers and no consumption of wage-goods by capitalists. Workers, in their turn, consume both wage-and luxury-goods. Interestingly, the impact of an exogenous shift of demand towards wage-goods on income distribution and growth depend on which sector is more labor intensive and on the sectoral profit-rate-elasticity of investment. If, for instance, the sector producing wage-goods were more labor-intensive (what is "by no means obvious empirically", according to Taylor, 1989: 632) , a shift of demand towards it would shift income distribution towards wages, both in the short run and in the steady state. But this would come at the cost of a lower steady-state growth rate, if the response of the other sector's investment to its profit rate were higher. A demand shift towards wage-goods would only improve distribution and, at the same time, accelerate growth if the sector producing wage-goods were more labor-intensive and its investment responded more strongly to its profit rate than the other sector's investment responded to its profit rate.
This model shows that, by incorporating structural heterogeneity, one can add another dimension to the relation between growth and distribution. The shift in demand composition can be interpreted as a shift in the distributive schedule 11 , indicating that composition effects can be important to explain the dynamics of the aggregate labor market or of the aggregate industrial structure that underlie the trajectory of the functional income distribution. In the case at hand, supposing that the sector producing wage-goods is more labor intensive, a shift in demand towards it results in a lower average mark-up, entirely due to the change in the sectoral composition of output. It is precisely these composition effects that will play a leading role in the Latin American literature, to which we now turn.
From estancamiento to the unequalizing spiral: the Latin American version
10 See, on this model, Dutt (1990b: 926) . 11 The model has a parameter that allows it to incorporate this shift in a way that does not impact aggregate demand, in order to distinguish between shifts in the distributive schedule and shifts in the demand schedule.
The concern about stagnation arrived in Latin America about a decade and half after it thrived in the rich countries. The context was a bit different. The aftermath of the war was characterized by bold attempts to accelerate development through industrialization in many Latin American countries. It was a period of rich experimentation with development policies, while at the same time the field of development economics attained centrality in academia. In Arndt's (1987: 44) . But it also led to a forecast of stagnation that would turn out to be incorrect. Furtado's (1965) version of stagnationism was a historically-informed interpretation of capitalist development in Latin America
13
. Its starting point was the existence of a large subsistence economy that acted as a reservoir of labor for the capitalist sector. The development of the latter would be shaped by a supply of labor that was virtually unlimited, which kept constant the real wage paid by capitalist firms, at a level just above the living standards allowed by the subsistence economy. 14 This feature entailed a polarization of the consumption market, characterized, on the one side, by a growing contingent of workers receiving low wages and enjoying a stagnant living standard and, on the other, by a small elite with rapidly increasing income (mostly appropriated as profits in the capitalist sector) and increasingly diversified consumption patterns. In other words, development was accompanied by high and increasing inequality. In this way, the dualism of the economy, divided between subsistence and capitalist sectors, was reflected in a dualism of the consumption market. And in Furtado's (1965: 166) words, "the concept of underdevelopment is related to the idea of structural dualism."
Furtado examines the impact of these features on the process of development by dividing it into three phases, in an admittedly schematic periodization of Latin American economic history (see Furtado and Maneschi, 1968: 6-7) . The first one, which lasted from the last quarter of the 19 th century until the Great Depression, was marked by high rates of growth of the exports of primary goods. The second resulted from the sudden reduction of the world demand for these products and the ensuing deterioration of the terms of trade, which led to import-substitution industrialization focused primarily on the development of a sector for producing nondurable consumption goods. The third phase, in its turn, represents a shift of focus of industrialization towards capital-intensive sectors, such as the production of durable and capital goods.
12 For the Brazilian controversy on the causes of increasing inequality during that period, see the papers published in the volume edited by Tolipan and Tinelli (1975) . For a summary in English, see Bacha and Taylor (1978) . 13 The following brief reconstruction of Furtado's argument will be based mainly on Furtado (1965) , Furtado and Maneschi (1968), and Furtado (1975: esp. chap. 21) . See also Furtado (1966) , where a Portuguese version of Furtado (1965) can be found together with a broader argument. It is true that Furtado's thought went through some changes between 1965 and 1975, but here the focus will be on its continuities. An analysis of the changes, in light of the contemporary debate and the actual development of capitalism in Brazil, would be a fruitful theme for future research. 14 The identification of surplus labor as one of the main characteristics of underdeveloped countries was widespread in the literature of the time. Its effects were more comprehensively explored in the work of Lewis (1954 Lewis ( , 1958 . See also Hirschman (1981: 7-10 ).
The polarization of the consumption market mentioned above contributes to bringing about the transition from the second to the third phase. Given the stagnant incomes of the majority of the workers employed in the capitalist sector the scope for the expansion of the nondurable goods industry is relatively limited. At the same time, the increasing incomes of the rich create a growing demand for luxury goods, such as durable ones. This shift, in
Furtado's reading, results in a reduction of the output-capital ratio, given that the choice of technique in underdeveloped countries is quite limited and is not influenced by the relative scarcity of the factors of production. In spite of the unlimited supply of labor, capitalintensive techniques characterize the production of durable and capital goods simply because this is the only technology available for their production, a technology imported from the developed countries. When these products were originally created in the developed countries, the technology used in their production reflected the fact that there was no longer abundance of labor in them (Furtado, 1975: 281-283 First, it reduced the capacity of the development process to absorb labor from the subsistence sector and, in this way, to transform the economic structure and enlarge the consumption market. He referred to that effect as a reduction of the employment multiplier of the growth process (1975: 283-289) . It had, in its turn, the effect of reducing the stimulus for investment in the agricultural and nondurable goods sectors that sold its production to the low-wage workers, which could otherwise attenuate the tendency towards capital deepening.
Second, the high capital-output ratios in the growing sectors meant increasing inefficiency of production, given that the limited size of the market entailed low levels of capacity utilization and the impossibility to reap the benefits of scale economies, with the result that grew faster than what could be explained by technological requirements (1965: 170). A related consequence was a demand leakage and a greater rigidity of the current account, given that the import content of the durable and capital goods sectors were higher than average and that some of the consumption demand of the rich was met directly by imports. Briefly put, Furtado's stagnationist argument related the cumulative process between inequality and rising capital-output ratio to a deceleration of structural change, rising inefficiency and a more binding foreign exchange constraint.
A few years later, in the beginning of the milagre, this view became increasingly untenable and started to be questioned. Probably the most famous critique of Furtado's stagnationism was provided by Maria da Conceição Tavares and José Serra (1971/1976) (1971/1976: 158) . Consequently, in contrast to his interpretation, they interpret capacity utilization in the sector producing durable goods as a cyclical variable, not as a structural consequence of minimum scales of production. In this way, demand plays a role in their view, by influencing capacity utilization and, through it, the capital-output ratio and investment. Second, they read Furtado's argument about the rising capital-output ratio as implying a decreasing surplus available for reinvestment, but claim that, given that the rate of profit can be decomposed as the output-capital ratio times the profit share, a fall of the former can be more than compensated by a rise in the latter, resulting in the end in an increasing surplus that could be reinvested.
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In this way, if for Furtado (1975: 289-291 ) the way out of stagnation entailed a deep structural transformation in the distribution of income, the consumption pattern, and the productive structure, for Tavares and Serra (1971/1976: 168-169 ) capitalist growth could be sustained simply by increasing inequality a little (incorporating a small segment of the upper middle classes in the consumption market of durable goods) and by compensating the falling output-capital ratio with an increasing profit share. The milagre was plausibly made possible in this precise way. Recent estimates by Marquetti, Maldonado Filho and Lautert (2010: 492) show that after falling continuously during the 1950s and early 1960s, the profit rate bottoms out in 1964, stabilizes until the late 1960s and rises sharply thereafter, reaching its peak in the early 1970s. This trajectory, in its turn, is mostly explained by the trajectory of the profit Lustig (1980) . 20 Their interpretation of Furtado's argument can be clarified in terms of the famous Cambridge equation (with causality interpreted from savings to investment, respecting his view), which relates accumulation to the propensity to save and to the profit rate. It is, in fact, an adaptation of the equation mentioned above, which assumes no savings out of wages, only out of profits. Given a constant propensity to save (Furtado's assumption), a falling profit rate (explained by a falling output-capital ratio) would lead to decreasing capital accumulation. Tavares and Serra's criticism is a bit complicated, because they not only question the necessary parallelism between the profit rate and the output-capital ratio by taking into consideration the rate of surplus value, but also hint at a demand-led understanding of growth (see, for instance, 1971/1976: 167) . See Bastos and d'Avila (2009) . 21 The decomposition of the profit rate mentioned can be represented in the following way:
, where is the profit rate, is output, is the capital stock, and Π is the mass of profits. They express the profit share in terms of the rate of surplus value, :
. So, an increase in the rate of surplus value is equivalent to an increase in the profit share. See Tavares and Serra (1971/1976: 163-164, fn. 6) share, which falls from the early 1960s until the mid-1960s and then recovers until the mid1970s.
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The nature of both Furtado's stagnationism and Tavares and Serra's critique of it is of diagnoses of capitalist development in Brazil. In the parallelism that is being suggested presently, they are the somewhat equivalent to Steindl's work. The move towards more general models, relatively independent of specific contexts, was made by Lance Taylor and Edmar Bacha (1976) . Their model represents for the Latin American story a transition similar to the one Rowthorn's (1981) , Dutt's (1984) , Taylor's (1985) American institutional analyses, we set up our model in classical form, stressing the role of distributional trends in shaping the growth process. " (1976: 199) Roughly put, their model suggests a cumulative process in which accumulation increases inequality, on the one hand, and growing inequality stimulates accumulation, on the 22 "The profit share stabilized with the military rule when pro-capital reforms and economic policies were implemented, and it rose during the 1968-1973 economic boom. The military dictatorship ended job tenure in the private sector, introduced a new wage policy that restricted wage increases, and removed the restriction to profit remittances." (Marquetti et al., 2010: 493) It might be useful to clarify that this interpretation of the milagre can be reconciled both with a supply-led and a demand-led understanding of growth. In the latter case, a rising profit rate was not only the result of a higher profit share, but also of the increase in capacity utilization generated by an adaptation of the consumption pattern to the productive structure through increasing inequality. Financial reforms that increased autonomous demand (allowing rising credit flows) also contributed to increasing utilization. Bastos and D'Avila (2009: 185-187) interpret the milagre along these lines and suggest that this is also Tavares and Serra's (1971/1976) interpretation. 23 The fact that Taylor plays a role in both episodes may reinforce the case for the parallelism suggested. . It is possible to represent it beginning with the macroeconomic equilibrium between investment and savings, as was done with the Kaleckian one, in the previous section.
Assuming that profits are entirely saved, that unskilled workers consume all their income and that skilled workers save a constant fraction of theirs, aggregate savings are determined by the level of profits and by total wages paid to skilled workers. They claim that this "amounts to a saving-investment balance in Kaleckian form " (1976: 206) .
They further assume a fixed short-run supply of capital and that profits are constant, determined by technical coefficients 25 . Thus, an increase in investment is balanced entirely by an increase in the number of skilled laborers. Given the fixed wage assumed (a constant multiple of the wage of the unskilled workers, which is, in its turn, determined by living standards in the subsistence economy, along the lines of dual-economy models), a growing number of skilled workers results in a higher amount of total wages paid to them and, thus, in higher savings. (At the same time, the higher number of skilled workers, given the fixed coefficients of production assumed and a fixed capital stock, result in a higher share of wages going to skilled workers. This is what the model means by increasing inequality: higher wage inequality.) Taylor (1989: 624) would later refer to this model as "neo-Keynesian," because it assumes that the economy operates at full capacity and that the adjustment, as mentioned, is brought about entirely by the number of skilled workers 26 . The effect of investment on the level of skilled workers can be explained by two kinds of mechanisms, one related to market mechanisms, the other, to social institutions. They explain the first thus: "Imagine that investment demand increases and is met, if necessary, by governmental diversion of resources to capital goods production (…). Then the cost of capital to industries producing consumer goods will rise, and the cost of labor will fall. But because unskilled workers have a stable real wage, the skilled wage will bear the brunt of the adjustment with a consequent shift in the skill mix toward higher wage employees. As a result, more skilled jobs will open up in the substitution response to increased capital scarcity. " (1976: 206) 24 An interesting question for future research concerns the methodological divergence between the two episodes here discussed. Whereas the Kaleckian thread resorts more commonly to steady state analyses, the Latin American version tends to use cumulative processes. The reason behind this divergence might be found by following the hint suggested by Taylor and Bacha (1976: 209) : "Most growth theory is ill-adapted to analysis of Belindia because it deals with steady states; whereas the topic of interest is a secular shift of production and employment patterns within the modern sector." 25 "[I]n a competitive economy, there is only one degree of freedom for trade-offs between the real wage and the rate of profit along the wage-profit frontier. The surplus labor fixed real wage in the modern sector thus determines both the rate of profit and the choice of technique. As long as the wage does not change, one might as well assume fixed techniques." (Taylor and Bacha, 1976: 200, fn. 6) 26 See Dutt (1990b: 925) .
And the second is explained in the following way:
"Given a repressed, inactive labor movement and strong social desires for upward mobility, it is easier to cut back blue-collar than white-collar jobs in the short run, particularly if some blue-collar employment reductions really take the form of upgrading to middle-class positions. On the supply side it is also true that increases in capital and luxury goods production levels will be related, since both subsectors are in the 'advanced' part of the economy and their entrepreneurs make investment decisions in the same expectational milieu. Once again, capital shortages will hold back expansion in more traditional wage goods industries, and poor workers facing escalating relative prices or elongated queues are always welcome to disappear back into the subsistence sector. (…) the substitution effect again works in favor of skilled employment increases." (1976: 206-207) The other side of the cumulative process is the effect of the skilled worker's wage bill on investment (1976: 209-211) . They justify this assumption claiming that it is a plausible simplification to "assume that investors look only to the leading sector of the economy" (210). Assuming, in addition, that the "leading sector" is the production of luxury goods, they define the growth of capital as a function of the growth of luxury goods' sales multiplied by a term that represents entrepreneurial expectations. 27 Moreover, given that, by assumption, unskilled workers consume only wage goods and skilled workers consume only luxury goods, the interaction between inequality and investment can be easily identified. Thus, the equivalence between aggregate investment and aggregate savings could be represented formally in the following way:
where is the share of skilled workers wages in the total wage bill, an indicator of inequality in the context of the model. Rising investment, as noted, increases the share of skilled workers on the total wage bill, pushing the demand for luxury goods up, stimulating thus a further growth of investment, which, in its turn, raises inequality even more. It is interesting to note that, like Tavares and Serra and in contrast to Furtado, Taylor and Bacha (1976) formulate a demand-led growth model that results in a positive relation between inequality and aggregate demand, a relation explained by their assumption about the determinants of investment.
Following Taylor and Bacha (1976), de Janvry and Sadoulet (1983) formulated a more general model that can result both in the mentioned cumulative process between growth and inequality or in its opposite, a cumulative process between growth and increasing equality 28 .
They refer to the two cases, respectively, as social disarticulation and social articulation. By taking this step of generalizing Taylor and Bacha's (1976) (1983) present a model that, despite its reference to Taylor and Bacha's (1976) , is a big departure from it. They go back, for instance, to the savings-constrained theory of Furtado, abandoning the demand-led closure shared by Tavares and Serra (1971/1976) and Taylor and Bacha (1976) .
Focusing on the interactions between inequality, consumption pattern, and productive structure, they identify the conditions that lead to either social articulation or disarticulation.
According to them, these conditions are essentially related to the key growth sectors (in terms of the share of total capital accumulation that each of them concentrate) and the level of inequality. High levels of inequality and capital accumulation concentrated in the sectors producing goods demanded by the richest segments of the population lead, like in Taylor (1983: 279) Interestingly, they attribute the explanation of such a process to Marx and to Kalecki (1983: 279) . It is indeed a description of what the Kaleckian literature would call a wage-led demand regime, taking into consideration sectoral diversity. In social disarticulation, however, wages are only "a cost to capital", given that "[n]on-workers incomes create both the source of savings and the expanding final demand for the key growth 28 De Janvry and Sadoulet's (1983) model is interesting for the present narrative because it completes the parallelism suggested, in spite of its questionable assumptions. On these, see Rattso (1986) and Dutt (1990b: 925-926). sectors." (1983: 279) Finally, their paper provides not only the mentioned generalization of Taylor and Bacha's (1976) result, albeit resorting to a different closure, but also a description of Brazilian development from 1968 to 1977, arguing that it represented an instance of social disarticulation, an interpretation of the period not unlike Tavares and Serra's (1971/1976) .
Varieties of growth and distribution models
The parallelism between the two literatures and the numerous affinities between them may suggest the fruitfulness of greater interaction. A more analytical classification of them, as the one indicated in Table 1 , below, can serve as a starting point for examining it more concretely. The top part of the table, due to Taylor (2010: 188) , is simply a systematization of the Kaleckian framework briefly described in section 1, above 29 . By putting together the potential combinations of demand and distributive schedules, with positive or negative slopes in the ( , ) plane, it presents four possible growth and distribution models. The stability analysis allows one to investigate the possibility of cycles and the different models might also serve to compare, in each of them, the impact of different economic policies, going beyond the more restrictive comparison between different demand regimes 30 . Moreover, by introducing a variety of models, the systematization broadens the scope of the framework, allowing it to be flexible to different historical, institutional and political contexts. It is plausible that, given different labor legislations and industrial structures, some economies might present, for instance, a procyclical wage share, while others present an anticyclical one.
Those two cases are represented, respectively, by the profit-squeeze distributive schedule and the wage-squeeze one.
[ Taylor (2004: chapter 7) and Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) . 30 The stability analysis reported in the table is a simplification. For more precise discussions of the issue, which is beyond the scope of the present paper, see Bhaduri (2008) and Lavoie (2014: 381-386) . 31 Goodwin's (1967) own model is a bit different, since it relates the wage share and employment (instead of capacity utilization), but it could be roughly classified as a savings-driven, profit squeeze one, model (4).
caveats that, in this case, the demand schedule and the distributive one operate in different time horizons, as mentioned, and that he actually resorts to a nonlinear distributive schedule.
This issue of nonlinearity is, by the way, an important limitation of the systematization above, since there is mounting evidence of nonlinear schedules (Nikiforos and Foley, 2012) .
Moving down to the bottom part of Table 1 , one finds four other varieties of growth and distribution models, inspired by the Latin American literature. Concerning the demand schedule, these models emphasize wage inequality instead of the functional distribution of income. In fact, Furtado's and Tavares and Serra's (1971/1976) work incorporate both dimensions of the distribution of income, but Taylor and Bacha's (1976) and de Janvry and Sadoulet's (1983) models restrict the analysis to the inequality between skilled and unskilled workers and workers and managers, respectively. Given the very substantial wage inequality observed in most capitalist economies, focusing exclusively on the functional distribution of income leaves out a potentially important phenomenon. Recently, this limit began to be addressed by Kaleckians with the formulation of models that incorporate either wage inequality or the personal distribution of income (Palley, 2014 (Palley, , 2015 Carvalho and Rezai, 2016) 32 . The Latin American literature could contribute to this ongoing research.
The distributive schedule that can be extracted from the Latin American episode is a larger departure from the Kaleckian one, because it incorporates sectoral heterogeneity. With a few notable exceptions, like Taylor's (1983 Taylor's ( : 170-176, 1989 ) model, the Kaleckian literature is based mostly on single-good models, disregarding issues that can only be dealt in multisector frameworks
33
. As Dutt (1990b: 915) argues, two-sector models are called for when there is a significant difference between the products of the two sectors. In the Latin American literature, two differences are emphasized. First, the level of skill required from the workers of each sector. In Taylor and Bacha's (1976) model, for instance, the sector that produces wage-goods employs only unskilled workers and the sector that produces luxurygoods employs only skilled workers. Second, the group that consumes the product of each sector is also different. To use, again, Taylor and Bacha's (1976) example, they assume that luxury-goods are consumed only by skilled workers and that wage-goods are consumed only by unskilled workers. 32 A hypothesis that could be easily incorporated in Kaleckian models is that the salaries of managers are related, in some way, to the profit share. This argument, put forward by Bacha (1974 Bacha ( /1978 in the Latin American discussion, allows one to connect the functional distribution of income and wage inequality. 33 For other Kaleckian two-sector models, see Dutt (1990a: chaps. 6-7) , and for a survey of models that incorporate sectoral heterogeneity, see Dutt (1990b) . For a critique of Kaleckian arguments from the standpoint of a multisectoral framework, see Steedman (1992) .
As can be easily noted, these two sectoral differences can easily generate cumulative processes. If wage inequality increases, the demand composition shifts towards luxury-goods.
This shift, in its turn, tends to increase the share of luxury-goods in total output and, through the labor market, to increase wage inequality further. This would be the unequalizing spiral, described by Taylor and Bacha (1976) , which corresponds in the table to model (6). De Janvry and Sadoulet's (1983) social articulation case could be roughly classified as model (7), an equality-led, unskilled-labor-biased-growth one.
That actual capitalist economies are characterized by sectoral heterogeneity in terms of the level of skill required for production should not be controversial. Nor that this may be a crucial mediation between growth and wage inequality, much of the change of the latter stemming from composition effects. There is more doubt, however, about the other source of heterogeneity, that is, demand composition. The evidence available (Wells, 1974 (Wells, , 1977 Lustig, 1982; Medeiros, 2015: chap. 2; ) is ambiguous, some of it suggesting heterogeneity, some of it suggesting that the composition of demand of different income groups is not different enough to have macroeconomic implications. Taylor's (1983 Taylor's ( : 170-176, 1989 ) model examined above is, interestingly, in-between the Kaleckian and the Latin American literatures. It is a two-sector model and it also has different income groups consuming the products of different sectors. But it does not take into consideration heterogeneous levels of skills between workers, so that the difference between the two sectors, concerning the production dimension, is their labor productivity and, given a common wage, their profit share. With this formal structure, a shift in the composition of demand towards luxury-and investment-goods does not increase wage inequality (which is assumed away) but it raises the profit share, if this sector is less labor-intensive. In this case, then, a distributive schedule incorporating sectoral heterogeneity is combined with a demand schedule that depends on the functional distribution of income. This example clarifies that the varieties of growth and distribution models are not restricted to the eight presented above, but can be extended to combinations of demand and distributive schedules that combine the two parts of the table.
Some particular historical periods seem to suggest the fruitfulness of the varieties of growth and distribution models that incorporate sectoral heterogeneity. The interpretation of the Brazilian milagre econômico along the lines suggested by model (6), Taylor and Bacha's, has already been pointed out. The more recent growth acceleration in Brazil, from 2004 to 2010, might also need a model of this sort in order to be properly understood, although now the dynamics seem to resemble model (7), the equality-led, unskilled-labor-biased-growth one. Further research is needed to assess this suggestion, but both falling wage inequality (and a growing wage share) and a shift of the productive structure towards sectors intensive in . The choice should be made based on what seems to be the more salient aspects of the development to be interpreted and it is plausible that, in some cases, the role of sectoral heterogeneity as a mediation between growth and distribution will be among them.
